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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
William Troy Hedgecock appeals from the judgment entered upon his
conditional guilty plea to possession of forged bank bills. Hedgecock specifically
challenges the district court's order denying his motion to suppress and his
sentence.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In June 2005, Hedgecock was placed on probation for five years after
pleading guilty to possession of methamphetamine and attempted forgery.
(Judgment of Conviction entered June 6, 2005, in Twin Falls County Case No.
CR-04-6692 (Augmentation) (hereinafter "2005 Judgment").) As a term of his
probation, Hedgecock waived his right to be free from searches.

(2005

Judgment, p.8, fl 10 , p.13, Exhibit A, fl6.)
On November 1, 2005, Frank Neumeyer, Hedgecock's probation officer,
went to Hedgecock's house "to see the residence and see what was going on
with the house." (Supp. Hrg. ~ r . ' ,p.1 I,L.23 - p.13, L.lO.) While there, Officer
Neumeyer found some items of "concern" including a scanner and a "piece of
manila folder, and cut out of that was a small, rectangular square that was
basically the size of a dollar bill." (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.26, L.23 - p.27, L.8.) Officer

' There are two transcripts included in the record on appeal, the suppression
hearing transcript, which will be referred to as "Supp. Hrg. Tr." and a transcript
that includes various hearings, including sentencing, which will be referred to as
"Tr."
1

Neumeyer was also concerned because the individual with whom Hedgecock
was living had "some illegal drugs on him." (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.27, Ls.9-13.)
Although Hedgecock was not home when Officer Neumeyer first arrived,
at some point while Officer Neumeyer was at Hedgecock's residence, a vehicle
pulled up which Officer Waugh, a Wendell police ofticer who was assisting
Officer Neumeyer, indicated he had recently stopped and Hedgecock "had been
in that vehicle at the time of that stop." (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.13, L.21 - p.14, L.l,
p.15, Ls.13-18, p.19, L.10 - p.20, L.14.)

The vehicle stopped briefly, the

occupants "looked over toward" Officer Neumeyer, "and then sped off." (Supp.
Hrg. Tr., p.21, Ls.4-9.) Officer Neumeyer then directed two "county officers" to
conduct a traffic stop to determine if Hedgecock was inside, "check the vehicle"
and "detain" Hedgecock until Officer Neumeyer "could get on scene." (Supp.
Hrg. Tr., p.23, L.18 - p.24, L . l l . ) The officers conducted the stop as requested
and notified Officer Neumeyer that Hedgecock was in fact inside the vehicle.
(Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.25, L.14 - p.26, L.1.) Officer Neumeyer thereafter responded
to the location where Hedgecock was stopped. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.26, Ls.2-4.)
Deputy Jeromy Smith testified that, pursuant to Officer Neumeyer's
request, he conducted a search of "the lounge area [of the vehicle] where Mr.
Hedgecock was sitting". (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.64, Ls.18-21.) The search revealed
"what [Officer Smith] believed to be counterfeit $100 bills in the

--

near the

passenger side seat," where Hedgecock had been sitting. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.29,
Ls.10-17.) The bills were "jammed between the passenger side and the middle

console."

(Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.29, Ls.13-14.)

After being read his ~ i r a n d a '

warnings, Hedgecock admitted the bills were counterfeited from a $100 bill he
had in his wallet. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.30, L.13

- p.32,

L.7.) Officer Neumeyer

testified that Hedgecock also admitted he had been using methamphetamine and
that he was going to use the counterfeit bills to buy drugs and then sell them to
"get good money back in." (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.28, L.23 - p.29, L.2, p.11-15.)
The state charged Hedgecock with possession of forged bank bills. (R.,
pp.11-12.)

Hedgecock filed a motion to suppress, claiming that although he

waived his right to be free from searches, he never waived his right to be free
from seizures and because there was no independent basis for seizing the
vehicle in which Hedgecock was a passenger, the subsequent search was
unlawful. (R., pp.38-39, 42(a)-42(g).) The court denied Hedgecock's motion.
(Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.79, Ls.6-14.) Hedgecock thereafter entered a conditional guilty
plea reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. (R.,
pp.46-47.)
The court entered judgment and imposed a unified fourteen-year sentence
with seven years fixed (R., pp.52-58.) Hedgecock subsequently filed a Rule 35
motion (R., pp.63-66), which the district court denied (R., pp.67-71). Hedgecock
timely appealed. (R., pp.59-61.)

Wiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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ISSUES
Hedgecock states the issues on appeal as:

1.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hedgecock's
motion to suppress?

2.

Did the district court abused its discretion when it imposed,
upon Mr. Hedgecock, a unified sentence of fourteen years,
with seven years fixed, following his plea of guilty to
possession of forged bank bills?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Hedgecock's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion for A Reduction
of Sentence?

(Appellant's Brief, p.8.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows:

1.

Has Hedgecock failed to establish that the district court erred in denying
his suppression motion in light of Hedgecock's Fourth Amendment
probation waiver?

2.

Has Hedgecock failed to establish that the district court abused its
discretion in imposing a unified fourteen-year sentence with seven years
fixed upon Hedgecock's guilty plea to possession of forged bank bills, or in
denying Hedgecock's request for Rule 35 relief?

ARGUMENT

I.
Hedqecock Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Hedgecock argues that although he waived his Fourth Amendment rights

as a condition of probation in an unrelated case, his waiver did not include the
right to be free from "seizures." (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-17.) Hedgecock further
asserts the "officer's [sic] lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle" in
which he was riding.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.10-13 (capitalization modified).)

Hedgecock's arguments fail as a matter of law and as a matter of fact.
Hedgecock's Fourth Amendment probation waiver includes a waiver of his
constitutional rights to be free from searches and seizures.

Moreover, even

assuming for the sake of argument Hedgecock only waived his right to be from
searches, not seizures, the district court correctly concluded there was
reasonable articulable suspicion justifying Hedgecock's seizure. Hedgecock has,
therefore, failed to show the district court erred in denying his suppression
motion.
B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers

to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d
306, 309 (2004). However, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,

resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in
the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 ldaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997
(1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 ldaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999).
The appellate court also gives deference to any implicit findings of the trial court
supported by substantial evidence. State v. Brauch, 133 ldaho 215, 218, 984
P.2d 703, 706 (1999).
C.

Hedgecock Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying
His Motion To Suppress In Light Of His Fourth Amendment Probation
Waiver
"ldaho appellate courts have long-recognized that

parolees and

probationers have a diminished expectation of privacy and will enforce Fourth
Amendment waivers as a condition of parole or probation." State v. Cruz, 144
ldaho 906, 908, 174 P.3d 876, 878 (Ct. App. 2007), review and rehearing denied.
In this case, the pertinent Fourth Amendment waivers state:

(1) "Submit to

searches. The defendant shall submit to a search of hislher person, residence

or vehicle at the request of any Probation Officer or a police officer." (2005
Judgment, p.8

81 10 (emphasis in original)); and (2) "SEARCH:

I agree and

consent to the search of my person, automobile, real property, and any other
property at any time at any place by any Agent of the Division of Community
Corrections or any police officer and waive my constitutional right to be free from
such searches" (2005 Judgment, p.13, Exhibit A,

7

6 (emphasis in original)).

Hedgecock does not challenge the validity of these waivers. Instead, Hedgecock
asserts the waiver did not encompass a waiver of his right to be free from
seizures conducted without reasonable suspicion. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-17.)

The Court of Appeals, however, recently rejected a similar argument in State v.
Purdum, 2008 WL 183377, Idaho App., January 23, 2008 (Docket No. 33073),
petition for review pending.
Purdum was on probation for possession of methamphetamine and, as a
condition of his probation, he was required to "submit to random, blood andlor
urine analysis upon the request of the Court, his probation office or any law
enforcement official." Purdum, 2008 WL 183377 * I . Purdum also waived his
right to be free from searches.

Id.

During Purdum's probationary period, an officer on patrol who was familiar
with Purdum and was aware of the conditions of Purdum's probation, saw
Purdum driving a vehicle and "decided to stop Purdum and ask him to submit to
a drug test."
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The officer had no reason to believe Purdum was in violation of

the condition of his probation and had no other basis for stopping him. Id_
Purdum initially fled on foot; however, when the officer eventually made contact
with Purdum he searched Purdum and his vehicle and ultimately discovered
drugs and drug paraphernalia. Id_ Purdum filed a motion to suppress claiming
"the police officer did not have the authority to detain him," which the district court
denied.

Id.at *2.

Purdum appealed.

On appeal, the court rejected Purdum's argument that the officer was
without authority to detain him "without suspicion and demand that he submit to a
drug test" as provided in his probation agreement. Purdum at *2. In doing so,
the court discussed the United States Supreme Court's opinions in Samson v.
California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), and United States v. Kniqhts, 534 U.S. 112

(2001), wherein the Supreme Court held probationers have a diminished
expectation of privacy and concluded that, although conditions of probation
cannot be implied, "an officer must be able to temporarily detain a probationer in
order to effectuate [a] search condition. Any other reading would render the
provision a nullity."

Id- at 3-4 (citations omitted).

While Hedgecock acknowledges the holding in Purdum, he nevertheless
"maintains that implying a waiver of his right to be free from unreasonable
seizures is an unlawful interpretation of his probationary agreement and would be
directly at odds with the holding of State v. Klingler," 143 ldaho 494, 148 P.3d
1240 (2006).

(Appellant's Brief, p.16.) Hedgecock is incorrect.

When Klinger was originally placed on probation, the terms of his
probation included a Fourth Amendment waiver. 143 ldaho at ---, 148 P.3d at
1241. Klingler's probation was, however, subsequently revoked and he was
placed in the retained jurisdiction program. kl_ Upon release from the retained
jurisdiction program, Klinger was placed on "unsupervised 'court probation,"' but
the terms of that probation did not include a Fourth Amendment waiver.

Id. A

probation officer nevertheless searched Klinger's home without a warrant after
receiving information that "Klingler 'may be selling drugs."'

Id.

Hedgecock also argues "[a] probation agreement is similar to a contractual
agreement" and, therefore concludes any ambiguous contract term "is to be
construed in favor of the non-drafting party."
(Appellant's Brief, p.13.)
Hedgecock, however, cites no authority for the proposition that a probation
agreement is the equivalent of a contract such that contract principles apply, and
the state is unaware of any such authority. The principles at issue with respect to
Hedgecock's Fourth Amendment waiver are clearly constitutional, not
contractual, and Hedgecock's invitation to construe his probationary terms
against the drafter, i.e., the district court, should be flatly rejected.

The ldaho Supreme Court agreed with Klingler that the Fourth
Amendment waiver included as a term of his first probation did not automatically
extend to his second period of probation because the "two probation periods
were discrete." Klinaler, 143 ldaho at ---, 148 P.3d at 1242. Moreover, the judge
did not "indicate in any way" that the prior terms of probation applied to the
second term of probation nor was there any "indication that Klingler ever agreed
to warrantless searches as a term of his second probation."

a

Because

"[clonditions of probation, especially a waiver of a Fourth Amendment right,
cannot be implied," the court concluded that absent inclusion of a Fourth
Amendment waiver as a condition of probation, Klingler retained his right to be
free from warrantless searches.

Id.

The court's opinion in Klincller did not compel a different result in Purdum
nor does it compel a different result in this case. A seizure is not an "implied
term," it is, as the court explained in Purdum, a necessary prerequisite to the
ability to search a probationer who has validly waived his right to be free from
searches. It is physically impossible to search a probationer without first seizing
him and to suggest that reasonable articulable suspicion or a warrant is required
for purposes of a seizure, when it is not required for purposes of the search,
strains logic. The issue in this case and Purdum is the scope of the waiver, not,
as was the issue in Klinqler, the exisfence of a waiver.
Hedgecock also argues that the holding of Purdum does not apply to the
circumstances in his case because, he contends, unlike in Purdum where the
officer stopped him for the purpose of asking him to submit to a drug test as

provided for in his probation agreement, "no such connection between the
actions of the officers and the seizure of Mr. Hedgecock can be drawn."
(Appellant' Brief, p.16.)

Hedgecock apparently believes the necessary

"connection" required the "probation officer or law enforcement official [to] state
that they desired to detain Mr. Hedgecock to effectuate a search of his person,
residence, or vehicle" before the seizure could be considered valid under the
terms of the probation agreement. (Appellant's Brief, pp.16-17.) In addition to
leading to the anomalous result that a probationer could only be seized if the
stated purpose was more intrusive, i e . , to search, this argument is contrary to
one of the central elements of supervised probation - supervision, which requires
the probation officer to have the ability to make contact with the probationer to
ensure he is complying with the terms of probation. (See 2005 Judgment, p.7,
4 "The defendant will make himselflherself available for supervision as instructed
by the probation officer and will not actively avoid supervision.")
Even if the waiver did not apply and therefore reasonable suspicion was
required, Hedgecock cannot establish Officer Neumeyer, or the officers acting on
his behalf, lacked such suspicion, particularly considering Hedgecock's reduced
expectation of privacy as a probationer. See Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (warrantless
search of probationer reasonable based upon totality of circumstances, including
state's legitimate interests in monitoring probationers' activities and probationer's
reduced expectations of privacy);

m,144 ldaho at 908, 174 P.3d at 878 (citing

KIingIer, 143 ldaho at 497-98, 148 P.3d at 1243-44).

When Officer Neumeyer searched Hedgecock's residence, as he was
unquestionably entitled to do, he discovered evidence indicating Hedgecock may
have still been involved in forgery, one of the crimes for which he was on
probation.

(Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.27, Ls.4-8.)

Officer Neumeyer also had a

reasonable basis for contacting Hedgecock based upon his discovery that
Hedgecock's roommate had "illegal drugs on him" and it would not be
appropriate for Hedgecock to live with someone who possessed illegal drugs.
(Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.27, Ls.9-21; see 2005 Judgment, p.9,

7

15 ("The defendant

shall not associate with anyone whom hislher probation officer directs helshe not
associate with . . ..").) Officer Neumeyer specifically testified he had Hedgecock
detained for these reasons (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.27, L.22

-

p.28, L.?), and

Hedgecock has failed to establish this was constitutionally unreasonable.
Because Hedgecock has failed to meet his burden of showing error in the
district court's order denying his motion to suppress, this Court should affirm his
conviction.

II.
Hedgecock Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion

A.

Introduction
Hedgecock contends that, in imposing a unified fourteen-year sentence

with seven years fixed upon his guilty plea to possession of forged bank bills,
"the district court failed to give proper consideration to his admitted substance
abuse problem and desire for treatment," his mental health, the support of his
family, and his claimed remorse.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.19-23.)

Hedgecock

further argues that the district court erred in denying his request for Rule 35 relief
based upon the "additional information" provided by the mother of Hedgecock's
son, which indicated Hedgecock and his son "need each other." (Appellant's
Brief, pp.23-24.) Hedgecock's arguments are without merit. The district court
considered Hedgecock's substance abuse problem and other factors bearing on
his rehabilitation potential and sentenced Hedgecock accordingly, and
Hedgecock's Rule 35 motion failed to provide any new evidence that would
support a reduction. Hedgecock has failed to show an abuse of the sentencing
court's discretion
B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is not illegal, the appellate court reviews the sentence

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Knighton, 143 ldaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 23,
24 (2006).
C.

Hedaecock Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Imposing A Unified Fourteen-Year Sentence With Seven
Years Fixed Upon Hedaecock's Guilty Plea To His Fourth Felony
The applicable legal standards for reviewing a sentencing court's exercise

of discretion are well established:
"A sentence is reasonable if at the time of imposition it appears
necessary to achieve 'the primary objective of protecting society
and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence,
rehabilitation or retribution applicable to the given case."' State v.
Lundquist, 134 ldaho 831, 836, 11 P.3d 27, 32 (2000) (quoting from
State v. Toohill, 103 ldaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App.
1982)). To show an abuse of discretion, the defendant must show
that the sentence, in light of the governing criteria, is excessive
under any reasonable view of the facts. State v. Strand, 137 ldaho
457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002).

State v. Oliver, 144 ldaho 722, ---, 170 P.3d 387, 391-92 (2007).

Where

reasonable minds might differ, the sentences imposed by the district court must
stand. State v. Toohill, 103 ldaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
On the day of sentencing in this case, Hedgecock was twenty-eight-yearsold and already had three prior felony convictions including convictions for
possession of a controlled substance and attempted forgery.

(PSI, pp.1, 6.)

Hedgecock also had juvenile adjudications for fraudulent use of a financial
transaction card, possession of a controlled substance, escape, and aiding and
abetting burglary.

(PSI, pp.4-6.)

In addition, Hedgecock had previous

opportunities for treatment, probation and retained jurisdiction, which were
unsuccessful. (PSI, pp.7-8; UPS1 dated 5/18/06, pp.7-8; UPS1 dated 1/19/07,
p.2.)
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court specifically
considered Hedgecock's substance abuse problem, as well a s his failed attempts
at rehabilitation. (Tr., p.88, Ls.1-9, p.89, L.12 - p.90, L.18.) The court also found
Hedegcock's prior criminal history significant, as well as, the fact that Hedgecock
received three disciplinary offense reports while awaiting sentencing in this case.
(Tr., p.91, Ls.13-15.) Hedgecock's history led the court to correctly conclude
Hedgecock ''just . . . can't follow the rules" (Sent. Tr., p.91, Ls.18-19) and the
need to protect society, the court's primary concern, justified a fourteen-year
sentence with seven years fixed (Sent. Tr., p.94, L.21 - p.95, L.16). The court,
however, ordered Hedgecock's sentence to run concurrent to the sentence
imposed in a separate case in light of the letters presented on Hedgecock's

behalf. (Sent. Tr., p.94, L.25 - p.95, L.3.) That Hedgecock believes the court did
not give "proper consideration" to his substance abuse problem, or other claims
of mitigation, does not establish an abuse of discretion. In light of the nature and
timing of the offense, Hedgecock's prior history of criminal behavior and drug
use, and his demonstrated inability to take advantage of treatment or succeed on
probation, Hedgecock has failed on appeal to establish an abuse of the
sentencing court's discretion.
D.

Because Hedqecock Failed To Support His Rule 35 Motion With Any New
Or Additional Information. He Has Failed To Establish Any Basis For
Reversal Of The District Court's Order Denvinq His Rule 35 Motion
"[Wlhen a defendant brings a Rule 35 motion and claims his sentence is

excessive even though it is within the statutory limits, the motion must be
supported with new or additional information." State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, --

-, 170 P.3d 397, 402 (2007) (citing State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, ---, 159 P.3d
838, 840 (2007)). When a defendant fails to support a Rule 35 motion with new
or additional information, the district court's order denying the motion will be
affirmed on appeal.
Hedgecock filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of his sentence, which was
supported by a letter from Melissa DeNaughel, the mother of Hedgecock's son.
(R., pp.63-66.) The crux of Ms. DeNaughel's letter was that Hedgecock and his
son "need each other."

(R., p.65.)

That Hedgecock characterizes this

information as "new" does not make it so. The court was aware at the time of
sentencing that Hedgecock's "son is an important part of his life." (Sent. Tr.,
p.52, Ls.16-17; UPS1 dated 5/18/2006, p.4.)

Indeed, in its order denying

Hedgecock's Rule 35 motion, the court specifically stated, "[tlhe defendant has
not presented, in conjunction with this motion, any evidence that was not
I

considered by the Court at the time of the sentencing hearing." (R., p.69.) The

1

denial of Hedgecock's Rule 35 motion must therefore be affirmed on appeal.

I

Farwell, supra.

I

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that the judgment of conviction entered

1

upon Hedgecock's guilty plea to possession of forged banks bills be affirmed.
DATED this 2gthday of May 2008

"

J ~ S S ~ CM.
A LORELLO
Deput Attorney General
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